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THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT 
AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
Edward Foster* 
The last decade has seen a continuing effort to amend the Con-
stitution to limit spending by the federal government, require an 
annually balanced federal budget, or both. The proposed amend-
ment would have a big impact on the economy, and many econo-
mists have spoken out on the subject, mostly in opposition, but 
some in support. 
Two related concerns lie behind the movement. First, many 
people believe that federal spending is excessive. It grew from 3% 
of total output in 1929 to 13% in 1947 (its low point between the 
high defense spending of the war years and the domestic spending 
of the post-war years). The post-war peak was 24.9% in 1982. In 
1984, it stood at 24% of output. Opposition to large government 
stems from (nineteenth century) liberal political philosophy. The 
economists who support the amendment generally share that phi-
losophy. But part of their justification is more narrowly economic, 
based on concerns about economic efficiency. High taxes sap incen-
tives, distort economic choices, and waste resources on tax reduc-
tion schemes. On the spending side of the budget, the size of the 
income flows controlled by government encourages us all to com-
pete for our share, wasting resources in the process. 
The second concern underlying the amendment is deficit 
spending. The federal government ran surpluses in seven of the 
fourteen years after World War II, from 1947 to 1960, but it has 
done so only once since then, in 1969. Meanwhile, the size of defi-
cits has grown, from an average of 1% of output in the 1960's to 
5% today. Opposition to deficits arises mainly from their link to 
high spending. Deficit finance allows the society to spend while 
avoiding the hard political issue of who will pay. Some economists 
are also opposed to the use of deficit spending to help cure unem-
• Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota. Many of the authors cited here, 
and University of Minnesota colleagues, have commented on an earlier draft. The author 
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ployment, on the ground that it is in the long run ineffective or even 
counterproductive. 
In the rest of this paper I describe the reasoning that has led 
some economists to support the amendment, outline the counter-
arguments from the literature, and end with a brief evaluation of 
the debate. I First, though, here is a brief summary of where the 
constitutional amendment stands with respect to passage, and a de-
scription of the most widely supported amendment proposal in the 
Ninety-ninth Congress. 
Since 1975, most of the amendment effort has been focused on 
a campaign to persuade thirty-four states to call for a constitutional 
convention. At least initially the expectation was that the threat of 
such a convention would persuade Congress to pass its own resolu-
tion for submission to the states. So far thirty-two states have 
passed resolutions. They differ in content from state to state, and 
some are now a decade old. Hence, Congress might not consider 
itself bound to call a convention following action by two more 
state'\. 
Congress has not, however, ignored this pressure. A proposed 
amendment passed the Senate in 1982, but failed to win the re-
quired two-thirds majority in the House.2 A balanced budget pro-
posal was passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 
September 1984, but did not reach a floor vote. (A drive in the 
House to force a similar proposal out of committee fell short but 
received 190 of the 216 signatures needed.) Proponents appear un-
deterred. New joint resolutions were introduced in both the House 
and the Senate on January 3, 1985. The proposal summarized be-
low had ninety-nine House sponsors; the corresponding Senate pro-
posal had thirty-four. Seventeen variations have also been offered in 
the House, and three in the Senate. 
Much of the impetus for this amendment arises from a tradi-
tion that is more interested in limiting the growth of government 
than in balancing the budget. But balancing the budget wins all the 
popular support, so most proposed amendments link the two. Here 
are the features of the most widely supported proposal: 
Section 1: Congress shall adopt a budget for each fiscal year in which projected 
1. Economists in general have wisely avoided analysis of the legal issues involved in 
the adoption and implementation of such an amendment, and so will I. For that discussion, 
see The Balanced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry Into Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1600 (1983). 
2. Senate approval may have been more in response to the political embarrassment of 
the day than to the rumblings from the state capitols. At least one editorial writer thought 
so: ''The immediate motive here is wretchedly trivial-to provide a little shelter for a con-
servative Senate as it raises the federal debt limit." Washington Post, June 21, 1982, at A 12. 
1985] BALANCED BUDGET 355 
receipts are at least as great as projected outlays, unless a three-fifths vote of both 
houses approves a deficit. Congress and the President are both charged with re-
sponsibility to ensure that actual outlays do not exceed those projected. 
Section 2: Total receipts shall not increase faster than national income increased in 
the preceding (calendar) year, unless approved by a majority vote of both houses (in 
the Senate version), or a 3/5 vote of both houses (in the House version), and signed 
into law by the President. 
Section 3: The President shall each year submit a budget consistent with the provi-
sions of Sections I and 2. 
Section 4: The provisions of the amendment may be waived in case of a declara-
tion of war. 
Section 5: Total receipts and outlays are defined to be inclusive (except for bor-
rowed receipts and outlays to repay debt). 
Section 6: Congress shall enforce and implement the amendment by appropriate 
legislation. 
Section 7: The amendment will take effect for the second fiscal year beginning 
after ratification. 3 
Without plunging into an analysis of the potential economic 
impact of this proposal, I will point out that it does not call for 
what most people would call a balanced budget. It says only that 
(escape clause aside), initial plans must call for a balanced budget, 
and that spending must be held to the level of those plans. But a 
shortfall in receipts compared to expectations could still lead to a 
deficit. Moreover, at least according to analysis by the Congres-
sional Budget Office, the amendment might contain a second escape 
clause in that it does not specify a penalty if no budget at all is 
adopted.4 
I 
The main economic case for a balanced budget amendment 
rests on an analysis of the incentives facing government officials. 
The analysis has generally concluded that overspending and waste 
in government are inevitable. Two distinct paths have led to that 
conclusion. One says that government officials are not to be trusted 
to carry out the will of the voters; the other says that the voters 
themselves are not to be trusted. 
A 
The topic is a novel one for English-speaking economists, dat-
ing back only to the 1950's as a subject for systematic inquiry. As a 
branch of economics, before 1950 public finance meant primarily 
the analysis of how the public would respond to government ac-
3. H.R J. Res. 27, and S. J. Res. 13, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
4. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BALANCING THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND LIMITING FED-
ERAL SPENDING: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY APPROACHES, ]932-36, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1982). 
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tions. The incentives facing government officials were not analyzed; 
the officials were implicitly treated as automatons whose only objec-
tive was to further the public welfare. American public finance the-
ory ignored an earlier European tradition in economic and political 
thought, which took a more jaundiced view of public officials and 
their motivation. The "public choice" theorists, who are now em-
ploying economic theory to analyze the behavior of government, 
have brought that literature back to our attention.s 
From nineteenth century European economics, the work that 
has had the most impact on public choice theory is K.nut Wicksell's 
A New Principle of Just Taxation, published in German in 1896 and 
translated into English only in 1958.6 Wicksell was the precursor of 
today's public choice economists in thinking about how to design 
rules for public decision making, taking account of the incentives of 
decisionmakers. In order to avoid coercion of dissenting minorities, 
which he considered the most unattractive feature of majority rule, 
Wicksell proposed two features for adoption of any spending 
proposal: 
(i) Each spending bill should specify the proposed distribution of 
taxes to pay for it. 
(ii) No such bill shall be adopted without "virtual unanimity" in 
the legislature. 1 
The required majority might be three-fourths, five-sixths or even 
nine-tenths. Wicksell observed that "absolute unanimity may have 
to be ruled out for practical reasons"; otherwise he would have pre-
ferred it. The proposal was intended to assure that negotiations 
would have to continue until essentially every interest group judged 
that an expenditure's benefits outweigh its costs. Both elements re-
appear, watered down, in current proposals. 
Problems of public choice have attracted increasing attention 
since Buchanan's rediscovery of Wicksell's work. Here is a sketch 
of a theory that is general enough to encompass most of this work.s 
1. People will voluntarily devote their energies to pro-
5. Buchanan, Public Finance and Public Choice, 28 NAT. TAX. J. 383 (1975). 
6. CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 72 (R. Musgrave & A. Peacock ed. 
1958). Translated by Buchanan; see supra note 5, at 393 for an account of the influence 
Wicksell's paper had on Buchanan's career (and therefore on the development of the field of 
public choice). 
7. CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 6, at 88-90. Richard E. 
Wagner, in an unpublished paper, has pointed out that Wicksell's understanding of the issue 
is deeper and more subtle than is suggested in the translated portion of his work. See R. 
Wagner, Limiting Government Spending: Alternative Constitutional Perspectives (1979) 
(Florida State University typescript). 
8. The following summary loosely follows T. ANDERSON & P. HILL, THE BIRTH OF A 
TRANSFER SOCIETY 4-11 (1980). 
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ductive activity only when they expect a direct return. 
Society's output will generally be higher, the closer 
the link between effort and reward. Output will be 
highest if each person can expect to receive the full 
fruits of his or her own labor, as happens in a 
smoothly functioning competitive market system.9 
2. The link between a person's effort and reward de-
pends on the existence of a system of well-specified 
property rights and a government to enforce those 
rights. 
3. The government that defines and enforces property 
rights enjoys discretion in how to do so. It can favor 
some groups over others; as a special case it can favor 
those who govern. 
4. With any system of government, those who govern 
have an incentive to extract wealth from the economic 
system, either directly in cash or perquisites, or indi-
rectly through expenditures that secure their tenure in 
office or expand their power. 
357 
To summarize, the need for government to have power to define 
and protect property rights invites government to collect too much, 
spending some of it for the benefit of the governors rather than for 
the benefit of the governed. 
5. Government's power to define property rights creates 
a new avenue for the pursuit of wealth. Possible 
mechanisms for enrichment through government ac-
tion include tax relief, government-defined monopo-
lies, subsidies, and regulatory changes. Moreover, 
because benefits are usually concentrated and costs 
usually diffused, political resistance to the creation of 
special privilege is rarely effective.Io 
These attempts to influence government can lead to excessive gov-
ernment spending (especially transfer payments). They can also 
lead to excessive government meddling that shows up in the com-
plexity of the tax code, in regulation of economic activity, in cum-
bersome eligibility rules for subsidies. The effect is to erode 
property rights and the efficiency of the economic system. 
9. We put aside some refinements of theory that deal with circumstances of market 
failure, such as pollution and other external effects of private activities, in which Adam 
Smith's invisible hand may lead us in the wrong direction. 
10. Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & EcoN. 211 
(1976), proposes a formal theory for this phenomenon. 
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6. Finally, to complicate the problem, even if society 
generally recognizes that government has become too 
big and too powerful, normal political channels of re-
dress are unlikely to succeed. So little of the benefit 
from reform is returned to the individual reformer 
personally, that no rational person would make the 
effort. 
Like any other academic group, public choice theorists are di-
verse and contentious; some could surely dissent from this formula-
tion. But this sketch does accurately reflect, I think, the general 
spirit of public choice theory. 
An important goal of public choice theory has been to explain 
the growth in government spending as a percentage of total national 
income, in the U.S. and other countries since World War 11.11 
Addressing that question, Buchanan and Wagner argue that 
unbalanced budgets are among the chief villains.12 Beginning in co-
lonial times, the U.S. enjoyed an unrecognized blessing: the en-
trenched belief that unbalanced budgets are immoral-a belief so 
firmly, and generally, held that it could properly be called part of 
the country's fiscal constitution. The result of this belief was that, 
while war or crisis might produce deficits, subsequent periods of 
peace and prosperity would produce surpluses that would retire 
much of the debt. This idyllic situation was ruined by economists 
who favored deficits when needed to stimulate deficient demand, 
and surpluses only when needed to restrain excess demand. Politi-
cians, brought up to fear the consequences of deficits and govern-
ment debt, heard only the more palatable part of that lesson: deficit 
finance is not a sin. Buchanan and Wagner blame the economics 
profession for not having foreseen this result, as we would have if 
we had given even a moment's thought to the incentives facing 
those politicians.'3 
Another set of explanations for why government grows has 
been developed from Niskanen's theory of the interaction between 
legislators and bureaucrats.l4 The theory hinges on the information 
gap between legislators, who control the size of agency budgets, and 
II. For a thorough survey, see Larkey, Stolp & Winer, Theorizing About the Growth of 
Government: A Research Assessment, I J. PuB. POLICY !57 (1981). 
12. J. BUCHANAN, & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEG-
ACY OF LoRD KEYNES (1977). 
13. Milton Friedman has also singled out deficits as a major part of the problem, be-
cause they allow legislators to enjoy the political benefits of spending without paying the 
political cost of explicitly distributing the obligations to pay the bills. The argument directly 
echoes Wicksell. See Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1984, at 12. 
14. W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). 
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the bureaucrats who administer the agencies. Legislators lack the 
detailed understanding of the internal functioning of each agency to 
be able to measure its efficiency of operation. Bureaucrats, re-
warded for the size of their empire rather than for their parsimony, 
can misrepresent the level of spending needed to attain any given 
level of service, and thereby extract approval of expenditures larger 
than needed. Hence, even if legislators were to act as perfectly loyal 
public servants, government would waste money because legislators 
could never learn enough to root out waste. 
Various other partial explanations of the expansion of govern-
ment spending have also been offered: 
1. Expansion of voting rights to include more poor peo-
ple and expansion of the number of (voting) govern-
ment employees both create constituencies who are 
beneficiaries of expanded government. 
2. The government's ability to control the agenda in 
public referenda on some issues means that the out-
come preferred by government can be made the least 
unpalatable among the choices offered to the voters. 
3. The imbalance for each specific program between con-
centrated benefits and dispersed costs creates opportu-
nities for log-rolling and pork-barrel vote trading. 
4. Coupled with this imbalance, legislators lack pro-
gram-specific information; they therefore become re-
ceptive to the one-sided information provided by 
lobbyists. 
To what extent have these explanations been subjected to criti-
cal scrutiny and withstood careful empirical testing? Larkey, Stolp 
and Winer give the literature a low mark: 
We are impressed with how much has been written and how little is known about 
why government grows. . . . The theories and empirical work reviewed in this 
paper are rudimentary. None of the theoretical work is sufficiently developed and 
tested to be persuasive as a positive theory or useful as a prescriptive theory. IS 
The assessment is probably correct. Yet some of the accumulating 
evidence does provide general support for the public choice view 
that government officials act in their own self-interest, and that this 
leads to overspending.t6 Whether these developments help to jus-
tify a balanced budget amendment is another question. 
15. Larkey, Stolp & Winer, supra note II, at 202. 
16. Frey, The Public Choice Approach to the Explanation of Collective Consumption, in 
THE GRANTS &ONOMY AND COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION 43 (R. Matthews & G. Stafford 
ed. 1982), gives a good survey. 
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B 
Developments in other areas of economics also bear on the 
question of the balanced budget amendment. Closest in spirit to the 
public choice work is the work by Stigler and his colleagues on the 
economics of government regulation. Previously, economists 
tended to treat government regulation as a panacea for market im-
perfections. A series of empirical studies by Stigler and others start-
ing in the early 1960's showed the naivete of this view; in fact, the 
regulatory agency often seems to have been "captured" by those 
regulated. 11 According to one assessment, the impact of this work 
has been "to put public interest theories of politics to rest," so that 
they are now "viewed as normative wishings, rather than explana-
tions of real world phenomena."1s 
Further support comes from persuasive recent work by Ol-
son. 19 He started to investigate the difference in growth rates be-
tween the "new" region of the South and West and the "old" of the 
North and East in the U.S. He was led to a hypothesis for which he 
found broad support across many centuries and many parts of the 
world. Old societies become rigid because so many deals have been 
struck. There is such a delicate balancing of opposing political and 
economic interests that they become immobilized and adaptation to 
change becomes impossible. The variety of cases Olson finds in sup-
port of the model is striking. 
Similar support has come from work in economic development 
that analyzed the costs of government tampering in the economy to 
encourage investment and protect local manufacturers. An unin-
tended effect of this government intervention is to divert resources 
in the private sector from productive activities to competition for 
government favors. Profits in the form of government favors are 
every bit as attractive as other profits, and such "rent seeking" or 
"directly-unproductive profit seeking" will continue to absorb re-
sources until the recipient of the government favor enjoys a net in-
come no higher than he could obtain from directly productive 
activities.2o Here the resource waste is generally not within govern-
ment, but is brought about by government activity (and in turn gen-
erates further government spending to respond to the lobbying 
17. G. STIGLER, THE EcONOMIST AND THE STATE (1975). See also Pe1tzman, supra 
note 10. 
18. Ka1t & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AMER. 
EcoN. REv. 279 (1984). 
19. M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). 
20. For references see Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575 (1982). 
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pressures, choose among competing supplicants for largesse, and so 
on). 
Another related development is Liebenstein's concept of x-effi-
ciency, so named because he could not think of a suitable adjec-
tive.2' The phenomenon under discussion is the opportunity 
provided by monopoly-by lack of competitive pressure-to be 
inefficient, to use cumbersome, high-cost methods of production be-
cause they are convenient for the manager, or simply due to his 
indifference to costs he does not bear. The argument mirrors Al-
chian's argument that a competitive system can produce reasonably 
efficient results in spite of itself, even with stupid or uncaring man-
agers in charge. Alchian argued that the relatively inefficient get 
weeded out by Darwinian competition. His analogy: 
Assume that thousands of travelers set out from Chicago, selecting their roads com-
pletely at random and without foresight. Only our "economist" knows that on but 
one road are there any gasoline stations. He can state categorically that travelers 
will continue to travel only on that road; those on other roads will soon run out of 
gas.22 
Monopoly means that there is no Darwinian pressure to be efficient, 
and a monopolist who is not motivated to hold costs down is un-
likely to do so. A considerable body of empirical evidence has been 
mustered for Liebenstein's view. Its relevance for the present dis-
cussion is that government agencies are the quintessential monopoly 
suppliers of services, and their managers often may not receive per-
sonal rewards for efficiency. 
The work discussed so far bears on why society might benefit 
by choosing to constrain itself to balance its government's budget 
annually. An analogous body of work explores why a single indi-
vidual might wish to constrain his own behavior in advance so that 
he could not later succumb to temptation. Everyday examples of 
this type of behavior include having automatic checking account 
deductions for a Christmas club account that pays no interest or 
asking other family members not to bring candy into the house. 
The issue of economic theory is posed by supposing an individual 
makes a plan today for his future behavior. If he reconsiders to-
morrow, will he voluntarily abide by the plan? The answer in gen-
eral is "no"--even if the initial choice was carefully made, 
consistent with his own preferences, and no new information has 
become available. Plans to diet always begin tomorrow; on recon-
sideration the next day, an additional day of delay always seems 
21. H. LIEBENSTEIN, BEYOND EcONOMIC MAN 29-47 (1976). 
22. Alchian, Uncertainty. Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. PouT. EcoN. 211 
(1950), at 214. 
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equally reasonable. Someone who recognizes his own lamentable 
tendency to revise his own plans in this way might wish to commit 
himself to live by today's plan. Society as a whole might display the 
same human tendency to postpone pain that some of us display as 
individuals; the balanced budget amendment could then be justified 
as a social equivalent to the Christmas club that helps bind us to 
frugality.23 
So far, the discussion has concerned the economics of spend-
ing, rather than that of deficits. Although deficits are related to 
overspending, they also involve distinct economic issues. First, 
there is an issue of whether economists approve of deficits as a tool 
of macroeconomic policy. We must distinguish between deficits as 
a steady diet and as an occasional Keynesian response to recession. 
If there is any issue on which economists are united, it is in disap-
proval of continual large deficits. There is, however, disagreement 
on continual small deficits even in periods of prosperity. A growing 
economy needs a growing money supply, and government deficits 
can provide that money supply. The printing press provides a mod-
ern kind of seigniorage, a mechanism for channeling a modest level 
of funding to the state without the economic distortions occasioned 
by taxation. But some fear that small deficits inevitably grow to 
large ones; to them, the risk outweighs the benefit. 
There is also disagreement on occasional deficits as a response 
to recession. A large majority of the profession continues to follow 
Keynes in believing that government programs to stimulate de-
mand, generating deficits in the process, are appropriate in the face 
of high unemployment. But each recent recession appears to have 
brought successively higher levels of unemployment in the next re-
covery. That brute fact, coupled with an attractive theory to ex-
plain it (the theory of rational expectations) has converted an 
increasing fraction of the profession, particularly its younger mem-
bers, to a new view: The public learns to anticipate government 
policy and to tailor their own actions to it, with the result that gov-
ernment policy becomes increasingly ineffective and even 
counterproductive. 
The last part of the above sentence is most controversial. For 
those who accept it, though, the conclusion leads to the view that 
simple rules of macroeconomic policy, followed consistently (e.g., 
23. I have not seen this issue linked to the balanced budget amendment in the literature; 
I am grateful to my colleague Neil Wallace for pointing out the possible connection, in con-
versation. The first discussion of the issue is found in Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in 
Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. EcoN. STUD. 165 (1956). See also Schelling, Self-
Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AMER. EcoN. REV. l 
(May 1984). 
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annually balanced budgets), will in the long run perform better than 
will a policy of active intervention. This position is a descendent of 
one advocated for the last third of a century by Milton Friedman, 
who has argued against professional hubris in attempting to manage 
the economy: Even if policy makers try to be helpful, they are more 
likely to destabilize than to stabilize the economy's performance, 
simply because they are so clumsy.24 
The new argument, however, is more subtle. It hinges on a 
simple fact about negotiations. In a series of negotiations, if you 
always "let bygones by bygones," and act to make the best of the 
current situation without punishing your opponent for past mis-
deeds, you have no way to keep him from similar misdeeds in the 
future. Any parent who has threatened punishment to a child who 
then disobeys, has faced the problem. Should you proceed with the 
punishment? It cannot undo the past act, and you will not enjoy 
administering it-but it might discourage similar disobedience in 
the future. If I ignore the trespassers picnicking at my vacation 
cabin I will have a more tranquil weekend than if I confront them, 
but I may regret it as the news spreads. 
The problem in both cases is that the opponent forms expecta-
tions about future response from current behavior. You may be 
better off to bind yourself to actions that are not in your immediate 
best interest, to help shape your opponent's conduct. The issue is a 
general one in adversary relationships, and it arises in 
macroeconomic policy. Once the operation of the economic system 
has led to a recession, it is in the government's immediate best inter-
est to use deficits to cure it. But if private agents in the economy 
rationally come to expect that the government will always bail them 
out of recession, their decisions on prices, wage rates, and all as-
pects of their contracts will be based on that expectation, possibly 
leading to poorer economic performance than if the threat of reces-
sion were always present. Kydland and Prescott have explicitly 
suggested a balanced budget amendment as a way to solve that 
problem.2s 
A second body of macroeconomic research related to the bal-
anced budget issue is the rapidly growing literature on the "political 
24. Friedman, A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability, 38 AMER. 
EcoN. REV. 245 (1948). 
25. See Kydland & Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Opti-
mal Plans, 85 J. PouT. EcoN. 473 (1977), and Dynamic Optimal Taxation, Rational Expec-
tations and Optimal Control, 2 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS & CoNTROL 79 (1980). For an accessible 
introduction to the rational expectations literature as it relates to economic policy questions, 
see Sargent & Wallace, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy, in RA-
TIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND EcONOMETRIC PRACTICE 199 (R. Lucas & T. Sargent ed. 
1981). 
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business cycle." The notion is that at least part of the driving force 
for business cycles in democratic societies is manipulation of the 
economy by the party in power prior to each election, in order to 
maximize their chance for reelection--despite costs to the economy 
that will be paid later. This hypothesis has considerable empirical 
support, which lends further strength to the general claim that gov-
ernment officials are hardly disinterested. It could serve directly to 
justify a balanced budget amendment in order to limit the opportu-
nity for such manipulation.26 
D 
Even granting the wickedness or clumsiness of government, it 
does not necessarily follow that a constitutional amendment is the 
appropriate remedy. Most of the arguments summarized above, 
from the public choice and related literature, suggest simply that 
government spends too much or spends on the wrong things. 
Others argue that government spends too much primarily because 
deficits are allowed.27 Less frequent arguments are made against 
deficits, and against any activist fiscal policy, independent of the 
level at which the budget is balanced.2s The latter argument, as 
advanced by Kydland and Prescott, offers the most direct link be-
tween the diagnosis and the proposed remedy. Government, in 
their view, needs to bind its future behavior for strategic reasons, to 
persuade other players in the macroeconomic "game" that recession 
is a real possibility, even an ever-present threat, in our economic 
life. Wagner has argued, too, that a balanced budget amendment 
would abolish the political business cycle.29 With these exceptions, 
the "scholarly" public choice literature is generally limited to diag-
nosis; it does not discuss remedy. 
Granted that we want to limit spending or deficits, why should 
it be done by constitutional amendment? In published debate on the 
amendment itself, I have seen four arguments that address the issue. 
26. See Alt, Political Business Cycles in Britain, in MODELS OF PoLmCAL EcONOMY 
155 (P. Whiteley ed. 1980), and Locksley, The Political Business Cycle: Alternative Interpre-
tations, id. at 177. These introductions do not point out, though, that the theory conflicts 
with the rational expectations view discussed above. That view would suggest that people 
cannot systematically be fooled by short-term policies that carry longer-term costs, as the 
"political business cycle" would suggest. On this issue, see Minford & Peel, The Political 
Theory of the Business Cycle, 17 EuR. EcoN. REV. 253 (1982). 
27. J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 12, and Friedman, supra note 13. 
28. Friedman, supra note 24, and Kydland & Prescott, supra note 25. 
29. Wagner, &anomie Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences 
and Constitutional Implications, 30 KYKLOS 395 (1977), explicitly recommends the balanced 
budget amendment as protection against the political business cycle. Buchanan and Wag-
ner's argument also suggests the importance of making deficits unacceptable. 
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First, as between legislation and constitutional amendment, legisla-
tion does not work. One Congress cannot bind the next, and we 
have a documented history of failed attempts either to limit expen-
diture growth or to balance the budget through legislation. We 
need stronger medicine.3o 
Second, and more persuasive, is an argument that comes from 
what Wildavsky has called the Pogo theory of overspending ("We 
have looked upon the enemy and he is us"). To the extent that 
government spending is due to logrolling, vote trading, and special 
deals with concentrated benefits but diffuse costs, we find it impossi-
ble in the ordinary course of political life to negotiate a joint reduc-
tion in spending that would benefit us all. Instead we all go on 
protecting our own little share of government largesse. This is a 
classic example of the prisoners' dilemma game, in which two pris-
oners would both benefit from remaining silent, but both confess 
because neither can afford to take the risk that the other will strike a 
deal with the police. In the government spending version, all would 
profit from a mutual pact to end the special deals that together bur-
den the economy with inefficiency. Yet each separately would profit 
from violating that agreement, if all other players held to it; and so 
all suffer for lack of a mechanism to bind each player to the behav-
ior that would benefit all. A constitutional amendment offers a 
mechanism to escape that dilemma.3I 
The third argument for adopting a balanced budget amend-
ment as a means to control runaway government is based on a his-
torical observation, coupled with crossed fingers. Though Hobbes 
saw unlimited government as the only alternative to anarchy, his-
tory offers significant counterexamples: 
Historically, governments do seem to have been held in check by constitutional 
rules. . . . (O]ur whole construction is based on the belief, or faith ... that tax 
rules imposed within a constitution will prevaiJ.32 
30. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BALANCED BUDGET-TAX LIMITATION 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, Rep. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1981). I do not 
find the legislative history of attempts to control spending as conclusive as do some of the 
amendment's supporters; in particular the legislation that was later ignored seems in some 
cases to have been slipped through by blackmail, as amendments to crucial bills, with no 
general commitment in Congress to support it. 
31. The "prisoners' dilemma" argument has been used by several proponents of the 
balanced budget amendment. I prefer the exposition of A. WILDA VSKY, How TO LIMIT 
GovERNMENT SPENDING 2 ( 1980). Another useful discussion is given by Riker, Constitu· 
tiona/ Limitations as Self-Denying Ordinances, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET 85 
(W. Moore & R. Penner ed. 1980). 
32. G. BRENNAN & I. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 10 (I 980). 
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Finally, some of those who support an amendment acknowl-
edge that the first attempt might not work: 
It is possible, even likely, that the constitutional limitations will not work any better 
than . . . other constraints have. It is typical that agreements to resolve prisoners' 
dilemmas are broken time and again until a satisfactory solution is found.33 
I believe that proponents would all argue that despite this risk it is 
important at least to try. One argument for at least making the 
effort is that even an unsuccessful effort to forestall may defuse the 
anger of the voters who might otherwise do something really 
crazy.34 Some see continuing budget deficits, and continued expan-
sion of government spending, as leading to inflation that threatens 
the stability of society. If so, the risk that the proposed constitu-
tional solution might fail is hardly a risk at all, for the alternative is 
so much worse. "Should we not look for genuine institutional re-
form within the structure of democratic decision making rather 
than for changes that replace this structure?"3s 
II 
The mainstream "response" to be summarized here is primar-
ily criticism of the proposed balanced budget amendment, not of the 
theory of public choice that I have summarized above. However, I 
am aware of two global objections that have been advanced against 
that theory, and I will review those here. There are also objections 
to the conclusion that the government spends more than people 
want it to, and to the Buchanan-Wagner thesis that our fall from 
grace started with Keynes. I will briefly review those objections, 
too, before describing the specific objections economists have ad-
vanced against the balanced budget amendment.36 
A 
The theory of public choice rests on the assumption of self-
interested behavior by all of the actors in the political process. 
North has pointed out that many aspects of behavior crucial to the 
33. Riker, supra note 31, at 89-90. 
34. This argument was advanced by one who had watched a similar sequence in Cali-
fornia: Governor Reagan in 1973 proposed an amendment to the state constitution to limit 
taxes and spending. The proposal was defeated, but perhaps as a result, the financially capri-
cious Proposition 13 was passed five years later. See Meltsner, Budget Control Through Polit-
ical Action, in THE FEDERAL BUDGET: EcONOMICS AND POLITICS 315 (M. Boskin & A. 
Wildavsky ed. 1982). 
35. Buchanan & Wagner, supra note 12, at 91. 
36. To do justice to the present controversy in macroeconomics, which as explained 
above bears on the debate over the balanced budget amendment, is beyond the scope of this 
review, the competence of the reviewer, and-no doubt-the patience of the reader. 
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political process cannot be explained by that assumption-from 
voting (after all, no one expects his vote to be decisive in any elec-
tion), to support of voluntary organizations from which there is at 
most a negligible prospect for personal gain, to acts of individual 
sacrifice and heroism. Many forms of action that lead to social 
change and many forms of inaction that lead to social stability re-
quire some explanation beyond simple self-interest.37 
Public choice theory is obviously, and crucially, incomplete 
until we learn to incorporate other motivations, notably those with 
ideological roots. As an argument against the balanced budget 
amendment, this objection need not be telling. A constitution 
should protect us against the worst impulses of the most selfish rul-
ers, so even acknowledgement that the theory is partially valid can 
help justify the need for constitutional protection.Js 
The second objection to the theory is intended specifically to 
warn against drawing potential policy conclusions. Musgrave 
points out that the conclusion, "government is not to be trusted," 
springs directly from the basic premise that government officials are 
interested only in their own welfare. One cannot leap from that 
theory to policy recommendations, without more information on 
the validity of the theory, to help us to judge the value of what we 
would gain compared to what we would lose.39 
The explanations offered by public choice theorists for the rise 
in government spending over time are particularly relevant to our 
present topic, because they are so often cited to justify the urgent 
need for spending limits and a balanced budget. These explanations 
have not fared well in scholarly debate, although the general verdict 
is that they are unproven but not necessarily false. With respect to 
Buchanan and Wagner's view that Keynesian economic policies 
have led to runaway government spending, Donald F. Gordon ob-
serves that the trend to increased government spending started well 
before Keynes (with generally balanced budgets), and that during 
the truly "Keynesian" period of American policy the ratio of gov-
ernment debt to GNP has fallen dramatically.40 Furthermore, the 
37. D. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN EcONOMIC HISfORY 11 (1981). Kalt & 
Zupan, supra note 18, give concrete evidence that ideology helps account for U.S. Senate 
votes on stripmining regulation. 
38. Brennan & Buchanan, Monopoly in Money and Inflation, 88 HOBART PAPERS 23 
(1981). 
39. Musgrave, Leviathan Cometh-Or Does He?, in TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITA-
TIONS 77 (H. Ladd & T. Tideman ed. 1981). He offers enough particulars to make credible 
the claim that the necessary testing has not yet been done. 
40. Gordon, Debts. Keynes, and Our Present Discontents, 4 J. MoNET. EcoN. 583 
(1978). The same observation has been made by others, but it is in pan misleading: While 
GNP increases with inflation, the face value of outstanding debt does not. Prices have in-
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growth in government spending since 1960 has been primarily in 
state and local, rather than in federal, spending;4t and debt in-
creases have been associated with shortfalls of revenue, rather than 
increases in spending. 42 
The logic of Buchanan and Wagner's position has also been 
challenged. They claim, first, that voters are generally ill-informed 
because it is not in anyone's self-interest to become an informed 
voter; and second, that politicians, and voters, listened to just half 
of the Keynesian lesson. Meckling asks what model of democratic 
participation makes it worthwhile for voters to learn just half of the 
Keynesian lesson, so that they become willing to accept deficits un-
critically, when before they were content to believe uncritically that 
a balanced budget was best for the economy.43 Olson observes that 
while taxes are unpopular, so is inflation. Why does the self-interest 
of politicians drive them to shelter voters from the former rather 
than from the latter?44 The argument requires a more careful speci-
fication of what information voters are assumed to have, either 
based on surveys or on a more fully developed theory of voter 
behavior. 
B 
There are sins of commission, and sins of omission. I think 
that mainstream economists' most important objection to the 
amendment is its attempt to protect against the first, at the risk of 
bringing about the second. The budget must project outlays twenty 
months into the future. With the amendment in place, a deter-
mined minority in Congress could prevent action in any emergency 
that had not been foreseen when the budget was drawn up. Reces-
sion, natural disaster, famine, or military threat could confront us, 
but unless there were extraordinary agreement on the proper course 
of action, prompt government reaction to the emergency would be 
barred. The mainstream of the profession accepts the potential for 
waste as an unfortunate cost of government operation, but opts for 
preserving its freedom to act. 45 
Another objection is that the amendment would be ineffective. 
creased five-fold since the end of World War II and account for the increase in GNP relative 
to debt. 
41. Meckling, Comment, in FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOC-
RACY 101 (J. Buchanan & R. Wagner ed. 1978). 
42. Musgrave, supra note 39, at 93. 
43. Meckling, supra note 41. 
44. Olson, Comment, supra note 41, at 106. 
45. Ackley, You Can't Balance the Budget By Amendment, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 
1982, at 4. 
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The military draft is the most obvious illustration that government 
has means other than expenditures to accomplish its goals. If imag-
inative accounting could not circumvent any specific laws intended 
to implement the amendment, other government actions (tax de-
ductions, regulations) could do so.46 Moreover, bureaucrats are 
past masters at focusing budgetary pressures on their most popular 
expenditures, rather than on the marginal ones.47 The end result 
could match the disaster of the prohibition amendment.4s 
From a technical point of view, there would be formidable 
problems of implementation. The proposed amendment calls for 
limiting actual outlays to those budgeted. The current budget pro-
cess does not directly control outlays, and they cannot even be fore-
cast with precision. If economic growth is slower than expected, if 
interest rates, retirements, or inflation are higher than expected, 
outlays will be higher than expected. Under current laws, much of 
the adjustment is automatic, and some of these automatic adjust-
ments are virtually unavoidable (e.g., the response of Social Security 
payments to the number retired, or the response of interest pay-
ments to interest rates).49 Implementation of the amendment would 
require either building some padding into projected outlays, so that 
they would become less informative, or else occasional emergency 
spending cuts at the expense of society's current needs. 
An interesting perspective on the proposed amendment comes 
from Herbert Stein, who has argued that controls on the deficit 
should be legislative rather than constitutional. The chief economic 
impact of the deficit is on economic growth, through its effect on 
private capital formation, because newly issued government debt 
crowds out private borrowing for investment. We should control 
deficits, if we want higher growth. But growth means presenting a 
gift to our children. We abstain from consuming all our harvest so 
that they may consume even bigger harvests in the future. The 
judgment of how much of society's resources should be directed to 
current uses and how much directed to growth, for the benefit of 
descendants, is one that each generation is entitled to make for it-
self. Part of the decision is taken away from future generations if 
46. Mcintyre, Discretionary Control of the Federal Budget, in THE CoNSTITUTION AND 
THE BUDGET, supra note 31, at 57, and MacLaury, Constitutional vs. Discretionary Con-
straints, id. at 63. 
47. Laband, Federal Budget Cuts: Bureaucrats Trim the Meat, Not the Fat, 41 Pus. 
CHOICE 311 (I 983 ). 
48. Olson, Is the Balanced Budget Amendment Another Form of Prohibition?, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET, supra note 31, at 91. 
49. Constitutional Amendments Seeking to Balance the Budget and Limit Federal 
Spending: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 526 (1982) (testimony of Alice Rivlin). 
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we embed the balanced budget rule in the Constitution.so 
Finally, a narrower objection has been raised to the require-
ment of a "super-majority" to waive the amendment. It is quite 
possible that a majority would build the coalition needed to waive 
the spending restriction by buying the cooperation of other groups, 
increasing spending in the process. California has for years re-
quired a two-thirds majority of the legislature to approve the annual 
budget, without thereby noticeably limiting spending.st 
c 
The issue of whether we are more helped or hurt by allowing 
flexibility to government, and whether the flexibility allowed by this 
amendment is adequate, is one for which there is no immediate ana-
lytical resolution. Each economist views the world differently, and 
in the current state of knowledge there is no ready test of which 
view is more accurate. 
Of the arguments in favor of the amendment the most promis-
ing is the macroeconomic argument advanced by Kydland and 
Prescott. Economic decisions made by the public when they know 
that government is constrained in its ability to rescue them later will 
arguably lead to a better-functioning economy than otherwise. Yet 
the argument is advanced within a limited context that neglects 
other important social policies, such as a desire to help the afflicted 
and the needs of foreign policy. These social policies may require 
flexibility of government response, just as the issues Kydland and 
Prescott analyze may call for deliberately limiting that flexibility. 
Their case is not yet proved. 
The "prisoners' dilemma" argument for the amendment may 
have merit. Yet it makes sense only if two conditions are met. 
First, each person caught in the dilemma must recognize his cir-
cumstances and accept the unpleasant truth that he, as well as 
everyone else, will have to bind himself to the agreement if anyone 
is to benefit from it. Second, those who enter into the agreement 
must not be able to make an "end run," abiding by the letter of the 
agreement but circumventing its spirit. The escape valve that per-
mits either deficits or increases in the fraction of total income 
claimed by government, gives an opportunity for the first condition 
to be violated. The opportunity for using tools other than govern-
ment spending (such as government regulation and tax advantages) 
50. Stein, Discussion, in THE CoNSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET, supra note 31, at 66. 
51. Stubblebine, Balancing the Budget vs. Limiting Spending, in id. at 50. 
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to redistribute income gives an opportunity for the second to be 
violated. 
Identifying the weaknesses in others' panaceas has been among 
the most important contributions of economics to policy making. 
Economic training equips one to think through unintended conse-
quences of policy proposals. Price ceilings diminish supply, import 
restrictions punish exporters, demand suppressed in one market will 
pop up in another. Indeed, the greatest contribution of the public 
choice literature is to extend the same focus on unintended conse-
quences to include the behavior of government officials and voters. 
Those economists who support the balanced budget amend-
ment have not, I think, applied the same discipline to that proposal. 
Will those who had the political power to extract benefits from the 
rest of society through government spending programs, find their 
power eliminated by this amendment? If not, to what alternatives 
will they tum? What will be the indirect consequences for the func-
tioning of the government and the economy? I suspect that those 
with political power would indeed find other alternatives, and I fear 
that the new economic and political distortions could be worse than 
the old. 
